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STATE OF UTAH
OOOOOOO

AMERICAN BUSH, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
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Case No. 960228

Respondent and
Appellant.
000O000

JURISDICTION
This is Respondent's Interlocutory Appeal, brought pursuant to
§ 78-2-2(3) (e) (ii) U.C.A. and accepted by this Court on August 9,
1996.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether

the

district

court

was

correct

in

its

determination that this proceeding is an original independent
action in which a review of a transcript of the Tax Commission
proceedings is not necessary.
Issue preserved below:
Standard of Review:

R. 125.

This is a legal question of statutory

interpretation, reviewed for correctness. State v. Vigil, 842 P. 2d
843 (Utah 1992).

2.

Whether

the

district

court

was

correct

that

the

independent nature of this proceeding deprived the Tax Commission's
ruling

of

a

presumption

of

correctness,

and

consequent

enforceability; and whether payment of the tax was therefore
necessary to a de novo proceeding in the district court.
Issue preserved below:
Standard of Review:
3.

R. 125.

Same as above.

If a transcript is ordered, is there a requirement as to

who must pay for it and have it prepared?
Issue preserved below:
Standard of Review:

R. 125.

Same as above.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE.

RULES

AND

§ 59-1-301. Payment under protest -- Action to recover.
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for
public revenue which is deemed unlawful by the party whose
property is taxed, or from whom the tax or license is demanded
or enforced, that party may pay under protest the tax or
license, or any part deemed unlawful, to the officers
designated and authorized by law to collect the tax or
license; and then the party so paying or a legal
representative may bring an action in the tax division of the
appropriate district court against the officer to whom the tax
or license was
paid, or against the state, county,
municipality, or other taxing entity on whose behalf it was
collected, to recover the tax or license or any portion of the
tax or license paid under protest.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-202.01(9)(a):
"Record" means all books, letters, documents, papers, maps,
plans, photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings,
electronic data, or other documentary materials regardless of
physical form or characteristics which are prepared, owned,
2

received, or retained by the judicial branch, and where all of
the information in the original is reproducible by photocopy
or other mechanical or electronic means.
§ 59-1-601 U.C.A.
District court jurisdiction.
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in § 63-46b15, beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions by
the
commission
resulting
from
formal
adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means
an original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a
trial de novo on the record.
(3) In any appeal taken after July l, 1994, from a
formal hearing to the district court pursuant to this
section, the commission shall certify a record of its
proceedings to the district court which record shall be
reviewed and considered by the district court.
A
district court may not, unless the parties otherwise
agree in writing, hear witnesses that were not called to
testify or consider exhibits that were not presented to
the commission at the formal hearing. If the parties do
not
agree, and
a district
court
determines
that
additional witnesses should be heard or additional
exhibits considered in the interest of justice, the
district court shall remand the case to the commission
for that purpose. This subsection supersedes § 63-46b-l6
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings.
§ 59-1-607 U.C.A
Decision of District Court as final determination.
Unless stayed, the decision of the district court shall
be binding on all parties until changed upon appeal. If
no appeal is taken, the decision of the court shall
constitute a final determination of the matter.
§ 63-46b-16 U.C.A.
Judicial review -- Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(l) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final
agency
action
resulting
from
formal
adjudicative
proceedings.

3

(2)
(a) To seek judicial review of final agency
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings,
the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form
required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court shall govern all additional filings and
proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's
record
for
judicial
review
of
formal
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules
of Appellate procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of
preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably
refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize
the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if,
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional
on its face or as applied;
(b)
the
agency
has
acted
jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has
issues requiring resolution;

not

decided

beyond

all

of

the

the

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;

4

(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to
follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed
in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated
to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 11. The Record on Appeal.
(See Appendix).
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellee accepts Appellant's Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Under the law as enacted in 1994, a decision of the Tax
Commission may be reviewed by an original independent action in the
district court, and a trial de novo.

The trial is not "on the

record" and is conducted as if the action was first filed in the
district court.

A transcript of the hearing in the Tax Commission
5

is not necessary, and need not be reviewed as part of the trial de
novo.
Because the decision of the Tax Commission is deprived of its
finality and its presumption of correctness, the taxes assessed by
the Commission are not required to be paid as a condition of
proceeding in the district court.

If a transcript of the Tax Commission proceedings is ordered,
there is nothing in the statutes which require the taxpayer to
order it or pay for it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF SECTION 59-1-601 REQUIRES THE DISTRICT
COURT TO CONDUCT "AN ORIGINAL, INDEPENDENT PROCEEDING" AND NOT "A
TRIAL DE NOVO ON THE RECORD."
The proceeding below was brought
pursuant to § 59-1-601 U.C.A.

in the District Court

That statute makes it clear that

this proceeding is an original independent proceeding, and not a
review on the record made in the Utah State Tax Commission.

The

statute authorizing this proceeding is entirely new, as of July 1,
1994. The proceeding is not a "judicial review" in the same sense
as that spoken of § 63-46b-16 U.C.A., where this Court or the Utah
Court of Appeals reviews the decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission for correctness and/or abuse of discretion. Instead, it
6

is a brand new proceeding which, in effect, vacates the decision of
the Tax Commission and puts the parties back at "square one" where
evidence may again be taken and the district court may make its
decision

based

on

the evidence

in front

of

it.

The only

restrictions on evidence to be presented is that witnesses who are
not called in front of the Utah State Tax Commission may not be
called to testify in the District Court, nor may new exhibits be
introduced, unless the parties agree in writing, or unless the
District Court first remands the case to the Commission to hear the
additional witnesses or view the additional exhibits, which
then be presented in the District Court.

may

The obvious intent of

that section is to avoid a litigant putting on nothing but a pro
forma appearance in front of the tax Commission and not giving them
enough evidence on which to base a decision.

If there is

substantial new evidence which may have affected the Tax Commission
ruling if it had been heard there, the Commission is given the
opportunity to hear that evidence and modify their decision. This
view is supported by the very excerpts from the legislative
committee hearings which were cited by Appellant in their brief and
inserted as an appendix thereto.
The testimony of Jim Lee was that the language of the bill was
"a compromise" which required that a litigant in district court was
"pretty much held to no further evidence and no further witnesses"
7

which had not been presented to the Tax Commission. (Appellant's
Appendix 4 at p. 2) . That was further clarified and supported by
the testimony of Senator Stephenson that the procedure was an.
effort that:
. . . bent over backwards to make sure that nobody who appeals
to the commission does so with the effort to just bypass the
Commission. They have their chance. They have the opportunity
to hear everything, and if they don't then unless it's
otherwise agreed in writing, the court will remand that back
to the Commission, and say you didn't present that, so you
have to go back to the Commission and give them their
opportunity to hear everything.... (Appellant's appendix at
p.17).
The Commission would now have the Court believe that this
statute was adopted with their interests in mind, and that their
interpretation has to be correct.

In fact, the Commission fought

this bill despite the efforts at "compromise", and now wishes to
gain by Court action that which they lost in the legislature.
During the testimony of Commissioner Roger Tew, he objected to the
procedure in the district court:
We comply with the Administrative Procedures Act as written.
We operate under the same rules that everybody else does.
What's being proposed here is to have us operate under
different rules.
What we do have concerns [about] however is that we don't
think [of] this as necessarily as a cost saving measure, since
what we're in effect going to be doing is potentially
relitigating some issues twice.
Before the Administrative Procedures Act was passed as
determined the last judicial proceedings that were held under
the old tax court acts they were not de novo proceedings.
They were on the record proceedings. And if the legislation
8

had the option of going to District Court on the record, I
suppose the Tax commission would be in a much more difficult
posture [in opposing it] than we are with the proposed
legislation.
Again there are some proponents, there's some aspects of the
legislation that we don't oppose. (Appellant's Appendix 4, p.
9). (Emphasis added).
The legislation did contain some non-controversial provisions
not at issue here which the Commission did not oppose; but the Tax
Commission opposed the provisions which they now say should be
construed in their favor.

These provisions were opposed because

they did exactly what Petitioner says they did; and those points
were specifically referred to by Commissioner Tew in his opposing
statement.
Commissioner Tew was accompanied and followed by Brian Tarbet
of the Attorney General's office.

Mr. Tarbet, also speaking for

the Commission, followed up on the same concerns:
I find it interesting that in the interest of saving the
taxpayer money we're going to add two new levels.
Now in District Court you're not going to have controllers and
CPA's, you're going to have attorneys representing these
folks.
If they go to the District Court, they're going to end up with
fourteen or fifteen judges who have limited tax experience,
who don't like tax cases, and that's why 59-1-601, the tax
court was done away with just last year, because they didn't
want these cases. You will not get good tax policy out of
this goulash that you'll have over at the District Court.
(Appellant's Appendix 4, p. 10).
In testimony before the legislative committee, the Commission
9

made its discomfort with the scope and type of review in the
district court obvious. They argued that the same matter was going
to be litigated twice (true), that the new trial was not going to
be "on the record" (also true) and that the district courts would
thereafter have a much bigger say in tax policy (again true) as
opposed to the "professionals" in the Commission itself.

Those

arguments were all considered by the committee; and they were
rejected. Somehow, the Commission, in bringing this appeal, hopes
to make all of that history disappear, and to have the act reformed
to meet the objections which have already been overruled by the
legislature.

This is an exercise in cynicism; and this Court

should not support it.

If the Commission has problems with the

legislation, they should go back to the legislature and try again.
This is not the forum for such changes.
The position of the Commission as to the nature of the
district Court proceeding is a result of misconstruing the term
"record".

When the code refers to the district court proceeding

as "an original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial
do novo on the record", the term "record"
transcript

or tape of

evidence taken at

seems to include a
the Tax Commission

proceeding. Some confusion may have crept into the procedure,
because

of

Appellant

the use of
uses

the word

that word
throughout
10

in the governing statute.
its

brief

to

include a

transcript; and then goes the extra mile in saying it is up to
Appellee herein to supply it! Rule 4-202.01(9) (a) of the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration defines the term as including "books,
letters, documents, papers," etc.

In short, it refers to the

material accumulated by the court in its file on the case.
The Tax Commission is thus ordered to turn over its file, including
books, letters, documents, papers, etc, to the district court; and
the district court is to review and consider that file.

Without

such a file, the district court is without pleadings, memoranda,
and other materials outlining both the legal issues and the facts
set forth by the litigants.

Without that "record", the court

doesn't even have the basic information as to why the taxpayer
thinks the taxes have been wrongfully assessed. Because the trial
court,

however,

is

conducting

an

"original,

independent

proceeding", it does not need to review a transcript of evidence
put on in the earlier proceeding.

This new proceeding will make

its own "record" (including tapes or shorthand transcription) which
will be the basis of any appeal.

This is not an appeal, and is

differentiated from one in the code. The trial judge will hear the
witnesses himself, and will judge their credibility.

As observed

by this Court in Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991):
The district court's findings of fact are based upon a
judgment of the credibility of the witnesses.
It is the
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of
witnesses, and we will not second-guess the court's findings
11

when there is a reasonable basis to support its findings. In
order to challenge the court's findings of fact, the defendant
must marshal all of the evidence in favor of the findings and
then demonstrate that even when reviewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. 806 P.2d at 1184.
That standard is specifically imposed on this Court in matters
involving a direct appeal from formal proceedings before the Tax
Commission by § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) U.C.A.

This Court, in such a

direct appeal from the Tax Commission, may redetermine issues of
fact only if:
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made
or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;
If the Commission succeeds in taking some of the originality
and some of the independence out of the "original, independent
proceeding", it will not be hard for the Commission to argue that
the actual trier of fact was in a better position to judge
credibility

and

therefore

must

be granted

deference.

That

determination would act to severely compromise the proceeding in
the District Court, completely contrary to the intent of the
legislature.
Appellee has attached as part of the addendum to this brief,
the "Request for Record" of Appellant herein. That request is for
four enumerated items: The "record" of the proceedings before the
Tax Commission and district court
12

(numbers one and three) and

"transcripts" of proceedings in front of the two tribunals.

At

this point, even Appellant recognizes that the "record" does not
include

a

transcript,

unless

the

transcript

is

separately

specified.
Rule

11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure also

reinforces the position of petitioner regarding the nature of the
"record".

That

rule

sets

forth

that

the

"record"

of

the

proceedings below, includes the index, the docket sheet, the
original

papers,

published

prepared for appeal".

depositions

and

"all

transcripts

The Rules of Appellate Procedure do not

apply here; and there is no authority in any code provision or rule
for the suggestion that a transcript is required.

The Tax

Commission is required to put the record of pleadings together and
send it over to the district court.

While there is no mention of

it in the law, there appears to be no bar to either side obtaining
a transcript for use in impeachment, much the same as with the use
of depositions; but it is not a required part of the record.
The Commission ingeniously refers to the case of Archer v.
Board of Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995) for the
proposition that, because this is a review of a formal proceeding
in the Tax Commission, it differs in scope and type from the review
of the informal proceeding referred to there. There is no support
in the Archer decision for that argument. In fact, the legislature
13

has required specifically the same type of de novo trial in the
district court after the Tax Commission's formal proceeding as
after the informal proceeding in Archer.

The legislature did not

have to do that; and up until recently, it did not.

The

legislative record referred to above is, however, full of reasons
for it so doing.

The Tax Commission unsuccessfully used many of

the same arguments in Archer that it is using here, in an effort to
avoid a full trial de novo in the district court.

In Archer, the

Court said:
In other words, the State argues that the district court's de
novo review of an informal proceeding should defer to the
reasonable exercise of statutorily delegated discretion to the
Division. We disagree.
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the rule previously
used in two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals
establishing the right to a new trial without deference to the
determinations of an informal administrative proceeding. 907
P.2d at 1144.
The legislature has specifically provided for the same rule
here; and they have made that clear to the degree that even the Tax
Commission should see it.

Their failure to do so only attests to

their single minded purpose of making their job of tax collection
easier, and of making the job of a taxpayer in contesting their
actions more difficult.
The Tax Commission, in one last attempt to gain something out
of this statute, cites University of Utah v. Industrial Commission,
736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997).

They suggest that their interpretation
14

will allow the district court to conduct "another trial" and to
exercise considerable discretion as to how it will be conducted.
In fact, the district court has clearly and firmly said how it
intends to conduct this trial, something that the State says should
be left to the trial court's discretion.

But the Commission

somehow maintains that this discretion should not be allowed. The
argument is utterly without merit, and without the "common sense"
that it purports to represent.
Finally, the Commission argues that an interpretation of the
law inconsistent with its own may potentially run afoul of the
Constitution of Utah, particularly Article XIII, Section 11,
defining the powers of the Tax Commission.

Nowhere do they argue

that this is a case of potential conflict; because it is not. The
courts of this state clearly do have the power of oversight over
the actions of the Commission and other agencies, to avoid the
agencies overstepping their bounds. Clearly, the courts have been
specifically empowered to make independent decisions which may have
the effect of overruling Commission decisions in a myriad of
situations.
forbidden

The few and specific areas where this Court has

the lower courts to interfere with Tax Commission

decisions are not relevant here.

Actions of the legislature are

entitled to the presumption of constitutionality; and there is not
a conflict between the statute and the Constitution of Utah, as the
15

statute is applied here.

Whether there are some instances where

such conflict might arise is a matter not to be speculated upon
within the confines of this case.
POINT II
IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR PETITIONER TO PAY THE DISPUTED TAX BEFORE
PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT ON A TRIAL DE NOVO.
Respondent cites § 59-1-505 U.C.A. for the proposition that
Petitioner in this proceeding has liability for the tax, interest
and penalties before being allowed to proceed herein.

That

provision is clearly at odds with the statute which governs this
action, and was not designed to apply to this action. This type of
action did not exist when § 505 was enacted.

At that time, the

only "judicial review" was through the provisions of § 63-46b-16
U.C.A.,

which uses the term

"judicial review" throughout to

characterize an appellate proceeding to the Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals "governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. "
§ 59-1-601 ends by saying "this subsection supersedes § 6346b-l6

pertaining

proceedings."

to

judicial

review

of

formal

adjudicative

§ 59-1-601 is an alternative method to that of a

direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court;
and such an appeal on the record may still be made if the aggrieved
party chooses that alternative. That fact is set forth on face of
the Order of the Utah State Tax Commission itself which states:
NOTICE:

You have thirty (3 0) days from the date of a
16

final order to file a.) a Petition for Judicial Review in the
Supreme Court, or b.) a Petition for Judicial Review by trial
de novo in district court.
The right to appeal to this Court or the Utah Court of Appeal
is specifically preserved for those who choose a trial de novo, by
§§ 59-1-607 and 608. § 59-1-607 is particularly important when it
states:
Unless stayed, the decision of the district court shall be
binding upon all parties until changed upon appeal.
No language exists giving the Commission decision the same
finality if a trial de novo is requested; and that silence is
indeed deafening.

The "original" and de novo proceeding renders

the judgment below null and void and of no effect. The trial court
was procedurally and legally correct in issuing a stay of any
enforcement proceedings taken by the Commission under its own
order.

This being an "original, independent proceeding," there

is no final decision from the Tax Commission in the sense that the
Order is enforceable and the judgment collectible, certainly at
least if the district court issues a stay as has been done here.
In short, all of the provisions applying to the appellate
procedure are superseded by this proceeding; and that applies to §
59-1-505, which refers to "judicial review" as a synonym for
"appeal".
appeal

to

The major difference between the procedures is that an
this

Court

or

the

Court

of

Appeals

preserves

presumption of the validity of the Commission decision.
17

a

No such

presumption of validity exists when a de novo proceeding is
commenced; and it would be completely contrary to the nature of the
proceeding

to

enforce

the

payment

of

taxes

without

that

presumption.
The argument made by Appellant is effectively that this
continues to be an appellate proceeding under the administrative
procedures act (admittedly with some exceptions) . That argument is
preposterous.

If this action had been meant to be part of the

administrative procedures act, it would have been within that act.
An appeal pursuant to § 63-46b-15 U.C.A. et seq. allows the
appellate court to overturn the decision of the commission only in
specific circumstances outlined in § 63-46b-l6 U.C.A.

It is a

proceeding on the record, and is geared to correcting legal errors
made by the commission. This proceeding is an entirely new type of
proceeding, and is an alternative available to someone aggrieved by
the Tax Commission's rulings, without conceding the finality and
validity of any rulings by the Commission.

Because of the wholly

different nature of this proceeding, the deposit of the taxes, or
the obtaining of a supersedeas appeal bond, is not necessary,
appropriate or contemplated.

Note that the 1996 legislature

eliminated the strict requirement of a deposit of taxes in an
appellate proceeding, and settled for the posting of a bond.
Respondent cites the Utah Supreme Court case of Jensen v. Tax
18

Commission, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) as suggesting that the Utah
Supreme Court has upheld its position.

That, of course, is not

true. That case came down two years before the statute under which
we are proceeding was passed. It did not contemplate the type of
proceeding

at

issue here.

Certainly

construing

the law as

Respondent wishes is not consistent with the right to obtain such
a review.

Requiring it would put a burden on the litigant which

would preclude many from exercising their rights hereunder and
would substantially abridge the additional rights given to the
taxpayer by the enactment of the new statute.
clearly

is attempting

to

transform

an

The Commission

original,

independent

proceeding into an appellate one, in which all advantage is on the
side of the Commission.
During the testimony of Brian Tarbet before the legislative
committee, he referred to the fact that § 59-1-301 of the Utah Code
already gives the taxpayer the right to go to the District Court,
by paying the taxes first and suing to get them back (Appellant's
Appendix 4, p. 10) . The implication is that this new procedure was
not needed.

If all this section did was to grant to the taxpayer

what he already had, Mr. Tarbet would be correct. Obviously, this
statute must do more; and it does.

As observed by Charles Brown,

a tax attorney who testified in favor of the bill:
Mr. Tew and his fellow Commissioners are honest honorable
people, but everyday when they hear a one side of the case
19

they have their staff people whose salaries they may raise
[inaudible] based on who they have coffee with, they might
ride up in the elevator with, on the other side they have
people they don't know. As honest as they want to be, as
honorable as they want to be, there's going to be a pretty
good subconscious bias there.
These exact issues were
analyzed by Congress in coming up with the federal system. In
the federal system you have the right to go to the United
States Tax Court without paying the tax, I might add, and you
get a trial de novo by a judge. The system we have now we
feel like a trial [inaudible] Mr. Hilliard having a case
before a judge and having all the parties on the other side be
members of the judges staff. A good trial attorney would ask
that judge to recuse himself because there's definitely an
inherent unfairness there.
The present system is unfair, because there is no opportunity
for an independent trier to hear the cases. . . . (Appellant's
Appendix 4, p. 10) (Emphasis added).
Even assuming the tortured interpretations of the law sought
by Respondent are accepted by this court, dismissal would not be
appropriate. The Utah Supreme Court has not required a deposit of
the taxes

"prior to seeking judicial review" but only as a

condition for proceeding; and the legislature has modified the
requirement to include the use of a bond. That is borne out in the
language quoted by Respondent which requires

(in an appellate

proceeding only) the deposit to be made "when a taxpayer is able to
meet

the

requirement".

If

this

court

were

to

accept

the

interpretation by the Respondent, Petitioner would still have a
reasonable time to deposit the taxes, to post a bond, or to
petition the trial court for a determination that the requirement
should be waived because of hardship.
20

POINT III
IT IS THE TAX COMMISSION WHICH MUST PROVIDE THE RECORD OF ITS
PROCEEDINGS TO THE DISTRICT COURT, AND NOT THE PETITIONER.
Respondent also makes the claim that the Petition in the
District Court should be dismissed because Petitioner has not
requested a transcript of the proceedings in the Utah State Tax
Commission.
language

That is an incredible assertion in light of the

quoted

by

Respondent

which

clearly

states

"...the

Commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the
district court..." (emphasis added)

It is the Commission which

must certify a record of its proceedings to the district court, and
not the Petitioner; and there is no other way to read that statute.
There is absolutely nothing in this law that suggests any duty
whatsoever on the part of Petitioner; and the Petitioner therefore
has no duty.

Petitioner, of course, dose not have the access to

the record which such a duty would require. It is true that an
appellant in an appellate proceeding ordinarily has the obligation
to order a transcript if one is necessary.

Petitioner suggests

that the language of the controlling statute, in omitting any such
duty, only reinforces Petitioner's position as to the nature of
this proceeding.

Only by referring to the Rules of Appellate

Procedure can such a duty be imposed on Petitioner; and those rules
have been specifically superseded in this proceeding.

21

CONCLUSION
The trial in this matter, to be held in the Third District
Court, is indeed a trial de novo in all respects.

This Court

should order the trial held in the same manner that the Third
District Court would try any case filed therein in exercise of its
original jurisdiction.

Because of the nature of that proceeding,

there is no presumption of finality or correctness to be given the
order of the Utah State Tax Commission; and no appellate bond or
prepayment of taxes assessed by the Tax Commission is required to
proceed in the District Court.

Any transcript ordered by either

party is voluntary only, and may be used as would a deposition.
DATED this

^

/ d a y of November, 1996.
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C.
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W. Andrew McCullough
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Respondent, 50 South Main Street, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah
84144.
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 11

(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as
it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks
jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment or order which is the
subject of review, if it plainly appears that no substantial question is presented; or may summarily reverse in cases of manifest error.
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case.
(Amended effective April 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment inserted "or an order granting a petition
under Rule 5(e)" in Subdivision (a).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Summary affirmance.

.
Summary affirmance under this rule is a deDismissal by court.
termination of the appeal on its merits, after
Permissive nature of motion.
t h e p a r t i e 8 h a v e b e e n af^ed a full and adeSummary affirmance.
q u a t e opportunity to present relevant arguTime for
filing.
ments and authorities. An appellate court's reCited,
jection of appellant's contentions as unmeritor ous
Dismissal by court
*
does n o t deny n i m ^ 8 right of appeal.
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See £pp 1988); State v Palmer 786 P.2d 248
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. < U ^ ? v £ p P D 1 9 ^ } i deC * ded ^ ^ f o n n e r
Ann
PP

1987)

" ,
Permissive nature of motion.
Appellate court's lack of jurisdiction to consider defendant's cross-appeal was not waived
by plaintiffs failure to move for dismissal under Subdivision (a). This rule is permissive, not
mandatory, and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Glezos v. Frontier
Inv., 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Ru

*e

10,

^ ^

R

* ^

A

PP'^

Time for filing.
A motion for summary disposition that is
clearly meritorious supports a suspension of
the time limitation contained in this rule,
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Cited in Benchmark, Inc. v. Salt Lake
Valley Mental Health Bd., Inc., 830 P.2d 218
(Utah 1991).

Rule 11, The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute
the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of
the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as
the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this
rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following order:
(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(B) the docket sheet;
(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order.
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of
the collated record with a sequential number using one series of
numerals for the entire record.
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court,
the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and
mark the bottom right corner of each page of the collated supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with the number next
following the number of the last page of the original record.
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(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The
index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in
the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper will
be found.,
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the
parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a
petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) P a p e r s on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall
consist of the following.
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the
papers, excluding any transcripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of
the papers will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion
of the filing of briefs. In such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the
clerk of the trial court, simultaneously with the filing of appellant's
reply brief, notice of the date on which appellant's reply brief was
filed. If appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall
notify the clerk of the trial court of that fact within 30 days of the
filing of appellee's brief.
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers,
excluding any transcripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall
file with the clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is
completed, a joint or separate designation of those papers referred to
in their respective briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of
the appellate court by the clerk of the trial court:
(i) the pleadings as defined m Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(lii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from
which the appeal is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of
law filed or delivered by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon
which the court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal.
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer
than 300 pages, the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate
court. Where all papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the
parties shall, within 10 days after briefing is completed, file with the
agency a joint or separate designation of those papers necessary to the
appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to the appellate court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of
the record or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All
parts of the record retained by the agency shall be considered part of the
record on review for all purposes.
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(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and
the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed
format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with
the clerk of the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties
approved by the appellate court, a person other than a certified court
transcriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate
court shall, upon request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers.
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by
these rules.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions
of the transcript.
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days
after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall,
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the
appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for payment of the cost of the transcript.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon
approval of the statement by the trial court.
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(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the
appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on
appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is
amended to make applicable in the Supreme
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for
preparing a transcript where the record is
maintained by an electronic recording device.
The rule is modified slightly from the former
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appellant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsibility to arrange for the preparation of the
transcript.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, added the second sentence in Subdivision (a) and made stylistic changes in the third sentence; in Subdivision (b) inserted "and any transcript" and substituted "a chronological index" for "an alphabetical index" m the first sentence and added
the third sentence; and in Subdivision (d) deleted "and Exhibits" from the heading, deleted

"original" before "papers" m four places, rewrote the introductory paragraph in Subdivision (2), deleting a second sentence similar to
the new third sentence in Subdivision (b), deleted "by the parties, as set forth in Rule
12(b)(2)" from the end of the first sentence in
Subdivision (2)(A), and added Subdivision (3).
The 1994 amendment deleted "where available" before "the docket sheet" in Subdivision
(a); subdivided Subdivision (b) and rewrote
Subdivision (b)(1); inserted "excluding any
transcripts" near the beginning of Subdivisions
(d)(2)(A) and (B); and added the third sentence
in Subdivision (e)(1) and the second sentence in
Subdivision (e)(2).
The 1995 amendment inserted "or if the appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a
transcript in a civil case" in Subdivision (g).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Correction or modification.
—Supplemental record.
Notice of transmission.
Purpose.
—Supplementation denied.
Evidence.
Incomplete record.
Statement where transcript unavailable.
—Adequacy of procedures.
Right to appeal.
Transcript.
—Factual matters.
—Purpose of rule.
Cited.
Correction or modification.
—Supplemental record.
In considering a motion to supplement the

record, the appellate court should evaluate several factors. These include the need for the supplemental material, prior opportunity to introduce the supplemental material, and length of
the resulting delay. Under appropriate circumstances and in the interest of judicial economy,
the court will deny a motion to supplement the
record. Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
The trial court properly supplemented the
record with respect to the circumstances surrounding the question of whether defendant
waived his right to a jury trial, when the trial
court had the parties submit proffers of evidence in the form of affidavits to the trial judge
stating the recollection each had of the arcumstances surrounding the waiver. State v,
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990).
Notice of transmission.
Although this rule does not require notice to

